1947 MINORITY REPORT ON (J) ASCO

By LtCol Robert D. Heinl, Jr., USMC for the Marine Corps Gazette July 1947

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That BATTERED FOOTBALL, THE ASsault Signal Company, is being kicked around again.

Special interests want to dismember the ASCO, "assault signal company" and --- judging at least from the April Gazette, in which a magic, all-purpose firepower-coordination party was dished up to the public---better substitutes are at hand.

To be sure, it was hardly a surprise that the postwar Field Artillery conference, held at Fort Sill, brought in adverse recommendations regarding continued existence of joint assault signal companies; in light of the history of most Army JASCOs, "joint assault signal company" such disposition of an apparently bastardized organization would seem only logical.

It is alarming, however, to see how far war-lessons and war-memories have faded since 1945; to see that already we have with us again that familiar peace- time phenomenon --- the all-purpose, all-knowing, all-trained single officer (and a lieutenant at that) who knows the capabilities, characteristics, limitations and techniques of all arms, and possesses a multi track brain with which to employ them.  It was this officer, with his super-unified supporting arms control-party, who was recently proposed in the Gazette as a substitute for the poor old assault Signal Company.

Someone must have loved the JASCO, however, or the Joint Chiefs of Staff (no less) would never have directed its organization, nor would the Marine Corps, hardly amateur in amphibious operations, have steadfastly retained the ASCO, a streamlined version of the prototype, throughout the war and into the peace T/Os.

For those --- and they are many --- who are a bit hazy as to just what a (J) ASCO is, let me recapitulate.  The (J) ASCO, meaning (joint) assault signal company, is a unit employed only in amphibious operations, which provides a single administrative and housekeeping roof for the naval gunfire teams, air liaison parties, and shore party communication teams required by a division during an assault landing.  During and just prior to operations, all these teams are parceled out by attachment to the respective rifle regiments and battalions of the division, so that in combat the (J) ASCO per se can hardly be said to operate at all except insofar as it regulates the flow of replacements, tabulates the casualties, and provides minor logistic backing for its dispersed elements.

At first glance, the three major sections of the (J) ASCO, namely, the Shore Fire Control Section, the Air Liaison Section and the Shore Party Communication Section, seem to be rather strange bedfellows, and, as we have seen, in battle go their separate ways.  They have more in common, however, than first appears.  Each is concerned to a great extent with communications; each must operate early in the assault; and the mission of each is to bridge the gap between landing force (troop) elements and various types of support furnished by external, usually naval agencies whether these be fire-support ships, close-support aircraft or the transport divisions and squadrons which actually land the force.  So far as is now known, there is no way to dispense with any of these types of support, so discussion about the (J) ASCO inevitably admits the functional necessity of the respective components, and the real nexus of controversy settles about organizational complaints:

·     The (J) ASCO is too large and unwieldy, neither proper company nor battalion, yet with enough officers for a regiment.

·     The administrative headaches are something terrible, especially with those blank-blank Navy officers in the Shore Fire Control Section.

·    It "belongs" in entirety to nobody on the staff, and therefore tends to be- come a fatherless child even when securely attached to a division.  Even then, only an attachment (in the Army that is) and therefore pre- ordained to the orphans' home. 

·     When employed in repeated amphibious operations --- by the now discarded practice (in the Marine Corps that is) of any one team, thus providing satisfactory support and services to no one.

·     The fact that (J) ASCO properly "belongs" to no single staff officer or vested interest often makes it a storm center of staff struggles for power.  The signal officer claims it for his own, while the air and naval gunfire officers* stoutly proclaim title to the Air Liaison and Shore Fire Control Sections. The artillery officer sometimes tries to take all because, after all, he co- ordinates supporting arms, and "coordination" can take in a lot of territory if it is defined aggressively by enough rank.  Occasionally, even, the (J) ASCO commander tries to run the outfit, and then everybody jumps on him.

·     It is---in the Army particularly --- not only an amalgam of services, but of branches within one service, so that a Signal Corps officer may be commanding a group of dashing field artillery-men, Air Corps bullyboys, engineers or whatnot.

All of the foregoing criticisms of the (J) ASCO really add up to the simple sum that the organization is unconventional and that, when employed by units unfamiliar with its peculiar characteristics, it usually affords only partially successful results.

In fact, the comparative history of the development of Army and Marine JASCOs and of their final divergence when the Marine ASCO evolved contains many lessons in the correct employment and usefulness of such units.

When originally formed, as we have said, by order of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in 1944, the joint assault signal companies, whether Marine or Army, were composed of a truly unwieldy mixture of troop and naval elements.  A large part of the total strength, mainly in shore party communications, consisted of the so-called Naval Section.  This was made up of Navy communication personnel --- signalmen and radiomen --- who were to be used for communication with ships.  This section was an administrative sore thumb, and like any other group of sailors ashore, particularly the hastily trained wartime variety, ill-prepared or indoctrinated for what would con- front them on the beaches.  It is small wonder that Army divisions, themselves understandably unfamiliar with service afloat or amphibious operations, were equally at a loss in training or preparing these strange Naval Sections for duties ashore.  The operational lesson gained quite speedily from early performance of the Naval Section was don't use it.  As a result, although the Naval Section survived in the T/O for some time, it was in fact dispensed with piecemeal from JASCO to JASCO and operation to operation.  The experience of Marine and Army JASCOs was rather similar in this respect, although Marine organizations, being themselves part of the Naval Service, were inherently much better fitted to absorb a Navy component.

Dispensing with the Naval Sections was the first long step in the evolution of the (J) ASCO.  The next lesson to be learned related to their employment.  As we have seen, it was originally envisaged that the JASCO should be at least corps, if not army or theater troops.  To be attached and withdrawn for succeeding operations, and in large measure serving as the magic component which would create the amphibious character of a division (Army in this case).  That was the theory at any rate.  In practice, it soon appeared that the JASCOs required as much rest, recuperation, and regrouping as any other unit; that when hastily attached to a strange division, little opportunity arose for the teamwork which is indispensable in amphibious assault; and that, in effect, you could not get amphibious divisions cheap by adding or subtracting a JASCO.

At this point, regardless of their theoretical status Fleet Marine Force Pacific took a major step toward gaining maximum usefulness from Marine JASCOs.  This was simply the device of permanently attaching a single JASCO to each single Marine division.  Since all Marine divisions are primarily amphibious assault divisions, there would be a constant need for joint assault signal company services, and, although the book still said that they were higher-echelon troops, Marine JASCOs, about the time of the Marinas campaign, at last found homes in the respective Marine divisions.  Such a step could not be so readily taken by the Army, how- ever, and Army's JASCOs remained detachable.

While all these large lessons were being digested, many small ones became evident.  These lay largely in the details of organization and in the composition of teams.  For example, as the technique of naval gunfire support rose to its final high levels in the Pacific war, "one learned that battalion shore fire control parties were wretchedly under strength for their grueling job, and that to secure really effective gunfire support, you must have well-trained regimental divisional naval gunfire teams over and above those provided by the original JASCO T/Os for battalions only.  Paralleling such lessons in the field of personnel, progress in techniques demanded new or different material.  Since JASCO T/O and T/E were matters of high Washington concern, it was not easy to accommodate the organization to lessons from the field.  All this was not generally perceived except within the Fleet Marine Force, which, with the Navy, had been the father of amphibious doctrine and thinking.  At any rate, realizing the ironbound problem of the T/Os, Fleet Marine Force Pacific, then commanded by LtGen. Holland M. Smith, in October 1944, undertook provisional modification of Marine JASCO T/Os to meet actual needs well in advance of action from Washington *Failing such action, or for that matter, any agency which could take just that action in the Pacific, Army JASCOs continued perforce to operate with shortages which must be made good from battle to battle by spare part augmentations at the expense of supported divisions so that the parent unit often ended up by supporting the JASCO rather than, as had been intended, vice versa.

By the beginning of 1945, using, say, the Iwo Jima operation as a milestone, there had developed in practice at least, a considerable divergence between the Marine and Army JASCO.  The former had rolled with the punches and had, in spite of the peculiarly inflexible mold in which both units were initially cast, found it's level and become fairly well integrated in the structure of the Marine division.  The latter was still grappling with its T/O and T/E, not to speak of some doctrinal uncertainties as to how it should be employed.  Both units, however, still bathed in the unwelcome notoriety which early difficulties had begotten, and it had become rather the fashion to disparage the (J) ASCO as a misfit, not what it now was (especially in the Fleet Marine Force), but for what it had been two battles ago.

If confirmation were needed that Marine thinking on the Q) ASCO was substantially sound, V-J Day virtually brought it, for, in early September, 1945, sweeping changes were promulgated in the Army JASCO T/0, so that, as revised, the outfit looked very like a Marine ASCO.  Alas (if that is the word), the new organization was destined never to be given combat trial, and, in the Army, the name, JASCO, remains under a cloud, a rather dark one.

The (J) ASCO is too large and unwieldy, neither proper company nor battalion, yet with enough officers for a regiment.  The administrative headaches are something terrible, especially with those blank-blank Navy officers in the Shore Fire Control Section.  It "belongs" in entirety to nobody on the staff, and therefore tends to be- come a fatherless child even when securely attached to a division.  Even then, it is still only an attachment (in the Army that is) and therefore preordained to the orphans' home. 

        When employed in repeated amphibious operations --- by the now discarded practice (in the Marine Corps, that is) of detaching it from one and promptly re-attaching it to the next --- it beats itself to pieces, and never learns to form part of any one team, thus providing satisfactory support and services to no one.

        The fact that (J) ASCO properly "belongs" to no single staff officer or vested interest often makes it a storm center of staff struggles for power.  The signal officer claims it for his own, while the air and naval gunfire officers* stoutly proclaim title to the Air Liaison and Shore Fire Control Sections. The artillery officer sometimes tries to take all because, after all, he co- ordinates supporting arms, and "coordination" can take in a lot of territory if it is defined aggressively by enough rank.  Occasionally, even, the (J) ASCO commander tries to run the outfit, and then everybody jumps on him.  It is---in the Army particularly --- not only an amalgam of services, but of branches within one service, so that a Signal Corps officer may be commanding a group of dashing field artillery-men, Air Corps bully boys, engineers or whatnot.

Shaking up the tables of organization is a pleasant imaginative sport peculiar to soldiers and naturally everyone has his own solution for the (J) ASCO.  The field artillery man doesn't care what happens to the rest of the organization, but he is certain that the naval gunfire teams should somehow become part of division artillery.  The Air Forces, interested primarily in air-support functions of the (J) ASCO, would like to see the Air Liaison Section taken clean out of a ground force organization and allocated to units for close support missions only as and if approved through channels.  Signal officers will give you half-dozen suggestions, three most frequent of which are:

1. Disband the (J) ASCO but make its component teams organic (within amphibious divisions, of course) to the respective units which they support in combat;

2.   Amalgamate the entire (J) ASCO into the division signal company

3.  Create a division signal battalion that includes (J) ASCO elements either as separate platoons or as an intact company.

        Among all these diverse proposals, there is but one common thread, which winds from point to point: the idea of special interest in only one or another aspect of what the Q) ASCO does.  To the artillery man, the organization is interesting mainly as the resting-place for shore fire control personnel; to the aviator, it is a roost for air liaison parties; to Signal--which, in all fairness, usually preserves the broadest outlook--it constitutes a tempting reservoir of trained communication-personnel and equipment.  What the artillery man and aviator some- times overlook is that a (J) ASCO has other missions than those which impinge upon artillery or close air support, whereas the signal officer forgets that in the majority of (J) ASCO operations, achievement of communication, Signal's ultimate, is merely the first step toward accomplishment of the (J) ASCO mission, which is to obtain and assist in employment of various types of support.  From the viewpoint of the supported units any such changes would be, up to a point, a matter of indifference (except perhaps if it came to inclusion of air, NGF and shore party communication teams within the supported battalions and regiments).  All that really concerns the rifle units is that they get the best possible support when they need it.  This boils down into four general troop requirements, which must be met, (J) ASCO or not.

These are:

• 1.   Those individual teams be suitably organized and adequately equipped.

• 2.  That the overall pattern of communications and command-relationships be adapted to actual needs and operational conditions.

• 3.  That teams are immediately available whenever required either for combined training or  in combat.

• 4.   That all teams are properly trained.

        The foregoing desiderata (except the second, which involves high policy) can be realized by the existing MASCO.  In organization and equipment, as we have seen, it now possesses T/O and T/E, which reflect a wealth of combat experience. For training, the (J) ASCO is really an excellent vehicle, because most basic and technical assault signal training must be centralized on division or sometimes higher level; yet all of it is wasted if teams cannot be intimately associated with their own supported battalions and regiments during the larger portion of the training cycle.  Availability is something else that the (J) ASCO provides; although its teams train separately, they are always at hand for supported-unit field problems, CPX, and, of course, during the last critical weeks prior to an operation.

Considering the present estate of the (J) ASCO, a number of statements may therefore be enunciated with some certainty:

a. The Marine ASCO, as organized and as employed, is a satisfactory unit.

      b Regardless of how you dismember it, the functional tasks now allocated to (J) ASCO must continue to be performed.

      c.  The (J) ASCO actually provides a desirable neutral ground for often-competing interests and elements, permitting great flexibility in assignment of its teams to rifle units when so needed, and yet allowing centralized operational control and training on the division level.

      d.  If the (J) ASCO's variegated composition begets administrative trouble; at least the difficulties remain at a head in one organization and are not spread thin, far and wide throughout the division.

       e.  Like any other highly specialized unit, the (J) ASCO should be kept off paper, should be given continual training, and cannot be whipped up on short notice for a maneuver or an expedition.

        f.  In any proposal to abolish the (J) ASCO, look for the hook--many such suggestions arise from the desire of one special interest or another to extend its control of personnel, extra equipment, or firepower.

Considering the foregoing postulates with the history of the (J) Asao's evolution, one is reminded of a wise old saying:  "There are some things in this life that need a good letting alone" At present this includes the (J) ASCO.

FOOTNOTES

*On Marine staffs, these are permanent special staff officers.  In Army amphibious operations, they are sometimes provided and sometimes not.

"One hundred twenty-nine thousand tons--count 'em--of naval gunfire support were delivered in support of Marines alone during the great Pacific battles, largely from the Marines on.

***FMF PAC Special Order 86-44 The term (J) ASCO is used because, in the Army, the unit under discussion is designated "joint assault signal company" (JASCO that is), whereas the corresponding Marine formation is simply called "assault signal company" (ASCO).  (J) ASCO represents the author's compromise.

This article was prepared before the reorganization of the FMF eliminated the ASCO as such.  The assault Signal Company has been eliminated by including the naval gunfire liaison teams on the special staff of division headquarters and by integrating the assault signal teams into the communications platoons of the infantry and shore party battalions.

The story of the JASCO tables of organization is a lesson in itself.  In as much as the JASCO's were formed by fiat of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, their T/O could be amended only on equally august levels.  Therefore, although people on the ground recognized many early defects of the JASCO, it represented a major administrative feat to convey the news to Washington levels where curative action could be taken.  Thus, the T/Os lagged so far behind public consciousness of the unit's defects that the JASCO's troubles came from long standing to be regarded as incurable.  The liberation of the Marine ASCO from direct JASCS control represented a major step in achieving the organizational flexibility that every new type of unit needs in order to develop.

And Now the Anglico

     Organized assault signal units, it seems bear much the same relation to the Marine Corps as some men's wives do to their husbands--something they can't live with, but something they still can't live without.

    The basis for this observation lies in the fact that, only two years since its apparent death (on adoption of the ill-fated "J" tables of organization), we have witnessed the timely rebirth--under a different label, to be sure--of the often cussed and much discussed assault signal company, or ASCO. 

Only this time we call it ANGLICO. "Air Naval Gunfire Liaison Company" is the full title, and, much like the de- parted ASCO, there is one per Marine division; in addition, we have a free-floating ANGLICO attached to FMFLant in a status and for missions we shall discuss in a few moments.

What and why is the ANGLICO?

    Beginning with the "what".  We can explain that ANGLICO is a company within the division signal battalion (itself a newcomer), charged with the performance of air and naval gunfire liaison and control missions for one Marine division.  To those few and the group was in truth few, who understood very much about the late, maligned assault signal company, the ANGLICO will present few surprises, for it consists, with streamlining changes, of a 1950 model of the ASCO (less the latter's rather misfitted shore party communication teams).  That is to say, ANGLICO is a company level housekeeping and administrative "roof" which embodies a naval gunfire and an air support platoon; each in turn constitutes the air support or the naval gunfire package of a Marine division.

    Because ANGLICO, despite its different name, falls so closely into the logical history which characterized the assault signal companies of World War II, it is important that we look backward to see what the present unit's forebears were like.  This necessity for background becomes all the more pressing when we realize that the wartime ASCO (or even the JASCO)** constituted a veritable storm-center of controversy and of no little complaint.

    Taking them seriatim, the JASCO, the ASCO, and now the ANGLICO, existed and exist for a single broad functional purpose.  To provide a kind of wind-and-water bridge unit.  Composed largely of highly specialized communicators) enabling the amphibious division to tap the immense reservoir of external fleet support during the critical hours or days of new-born battle when air and naval gunfire are the elements that keep the landing force on the beaches.

    Among quite a number of oddities which have always given assault signal units their rather queer coloration to the orthodox military eye, is the fact that the company--be it ASCO, JASCO, or ANGLICO--never fights (and only infrequently trains) as a unit.  Its only appearance in one place is between battles, for a Saturday inspection or pay-call.  In fact the only reason the company exists as such is to provide an administrative and housekeeping neighborhood in which the separate teams and parties that constitute' the outfit's raison d'être may live and conduct most economical, coordinate training.

    The separate teams just mentioned are split 50-50 between the air support platoon and the naval gunfire platoon.  The teams, which belong to each arm, are, at war strength, apportioned during combat, to all the division's rifle battalions; to each rifle regiment; and one for division headquarters itself.  No additional means are at present provided either for reserve purposes or for special assignments to other than rifle units.  The missions of the respective teams, both air and naval gunfire, are 'to control, coordinate, and advise concerning the air support and naval gunfire support of the echelon to which the team may be assigned.

    Hope this helps you to understand what ANGLICO is. There remains unanswered, however, the "Why" which many of those ask who witnessed the seeming jettison of the predecessor ASCO during the "J" T/O hegira.  It will be remembered that, during this period, naval gunfire and air control elements were parceled out (in face of some misgivings among experienced officers) to become organic portions of the communication organization of the various battalions and divisions about which the "J" T/Os shaped themselves.

    Why, therefore, did we promptly resurrect the assault signal idea, and create the ANGLICO? The answer is twofold.

1.       The assault signal company, or ASCO, was not quite as dead as the "J" T/Os seemed to have killed it.  In the current war tables the ASCO, in fact, survived all along.  Even those who danced on its grave to the tune of "J" T/Os seem to have been unwilling to drive a stake through it heart by getting rid of it entirely as a wartime agency for service when chips were really down.

2.       The more impelling reason for renascence of the ANGLICO was the fact that it became apparent that such an organization as this was fully as necessary in peace as in war.

     The principal reasons why the ANGLICO (or some kind of division-level assault signal unit) remains (in spite of its rather unorthodox character) a vast and necessary improvement over any other expedient may be summarized as follows.

1.       The nature of training, both for air and gunfire teams, is susceptible of mass handling at a single level; moreover, the persons obviously best qualified to conduct this training are the division's two leading specialists in their respective fields, the air officer and the naval gunfire officer.  Both of these functionaries operate at division level.

2.       When organic to the communication elements of the lower (infantry battalion) units, the various air and gunfire teams are not only extremely hard to assemble for collective training, but also tend to lose their specialist abilities and identity.  About this time, they submerge into the run-of-the-mine communications work which hard-pressed battalion and regimental communications officers never see the end of.

3.      Unless concentrated in a single unit, individual air and naval gunfire teams tend to lose doctrinal uniformity, and often take on the differing coloration's of the preferences, not to say the professional eccentricities, of individual unit commanders under whom they constantly serve.

4.      Ideally speaking, a substantial portion of the annual air and naval gunfire team training cycle should be conducted away from the division, at gunfire and air support schools and bombardment ranges.  This detachment of teams can be more readily accomplished if they are grouped in a single unit at division level.

         Up to this point, we have confined ourselves to the ANGLICO, which constitutes part of the Marine division.  A while back, we spoke of one other air-naval gunfire liaison company, one, which operates directly under Fleet Marine Force Atlantic.

Although the peacetime composition of this company is identical with those in two Marine divisions, its mission is somewhat different.

    The ANGLICO, Fleet Marine Force Atlantic, in some senses precipitated post- war decision as to how we should organize our air and naval gunfire teams.  Things happened in this wise.

    During the inevitable shaping of up and digestion of World War II's amphibious lessons, the Army disbanded its joint assault signal companies (the old "JASCOs", it will be recalled).  These had never for a number of reasons, been marked by great success, nor had they evolved as rapidly or as realistically as their Marine counterpart.

    More to the point, the very mission of the Army (as a cadre force for mobilization and large-scale land warfare) makes it desirable that this Service not maintains extensive specialized amphibious formations.

    For these reasons, it seemed logical that a non-divisional Marine ANGLICO be formed to provide air and naval gunfire liaison elements to support Army divisions during occasional ventures into amphibious training.  This additional ANGLICO operates as part of Fleet Marine Force Atlantic's force troops.

    In general, the effect of this decision was to bring about prompt organization of the Fleet Marine Force Atlantic ANGLICO.  This unit, in fact, became the prototype unit in the Fleet Marine Force, and it has already participated, lock, stock, and barrel, in both the MIKI and POR maneuvers.  The value of such participation has shown itself, of course, in the excellent air and naval gunfire training derived and in the less immediately recognized fact that existence of the Force ANGLICO greatly enhances the Marine Corps--Navy reserve of trained specialists in critical fields.

    For the benefit of the intelligent if tumultuous group who complain that nothing we did or were in the wholly amphibious days of 1945 any longer enjoys proper merit, it might be well to consider the charge that the ANGLICO reflects only the refined and evaluated practice of World War II, rather than any step forward.

    In the main, it must be admitted, this observation is true.  Thus, brand-new though the air-naval gunfire liaison company may be, we might even now be turning over in our minds the ways in which it can be improved for present missions, adapted or trained to perform new jobs, and in general shaped toward the next, rather than the past war.

    In a word--what forward step can we expect or contemplate which will bring the ANGLICO fully abreast of the trends of tomorrow? 

    As this writer reflects, there seem to be some nine possible changes or developments that would benefit the ANGLICO of today.  Adoption of any would represent a step forward.***

1.      Tactical air control and shore fire control parties have become unwieldy large.  If this trend continues, they may become unable to provide effective front-line support.  We must point aggressively toward general reductions--based, however, on fully acceptable cuts--thanks to all-purpose, lightweight communication equipment.

2.       Every possible measure must be taken to render the TACP and SFCP of next week a readily air-transportable or airborne unit.  Even the use of parachute TACPs or SFCPs should not be regarded as one normally contingent to any FMF unit.

3.      A shore fire control party (and perhaps a tactical air control party also) should be provided for each tank battalion.  Needless to say, this postulates the need for a specially equipped air or naval gunfire liaison tank, built to serve an armored OP.

4.      In each division ANGLICO.  There should be at least two additional shore fire control parties for "general reserve" duties--not only to provide much-needed trained battle replacements, but mote important to give us units to provide naval -gunfire support for the LVT-Als, for the reconnaissance company, or for offshore spotting work in control of regimental or divisional direct-support ships.

5.      We should look forward to and fully investigate the possibility of transforming the shore fire control party (SFCP) into a guided missile control party (GMCP).

6.      Along the same line, the forward air controller must prepare himself to become, if technology permits, an electronics guided missile specialist.

7.      As jet aircraft displace the conventional on-station support airplanes of yesterday, the forward air controller must increasingly prepare to assume duties now handled by the air coordinator.  This will involve the addition of new and specialized communications equipment as well as a considerable broadening of technique.

8.      Finally, the Fleet Marine Force ANGLICO must not only be regarded as an adjunct to peacetime maneuvers or to Army improvisations, but, more important, as a pool in being of trained assault signal teams for FMF mobilization and for conversion into corps or force air and naval gunfire control teams.

    In terms of today's market for firepower, the air-naval gunfire liaison company is a better than average buy, a much more efficient package even than its war- sharpened predecessor, the ASCO. Those, however, who know the pioneering spirit which has ever distinguished the Fleet Marine Force will be anxious that this unit--like every Marine unit--be oriented neither toward the past nor exclusively to the proven present, but to the future which--for the Marine Corps--looms so full of opportunity and so full of change.

FOOTNOTES

* For a discussion of the assault signal idea's wartime tribulations, see Minority Report on the (J) ASCO.  Marine Corps Gazette, July 1947.

** The difference between an ASCO (assault signal company) and a JASCO (joint assault signal company) was that the former represented an M-1945 Marine

Corps evolution over the rather theoretical and not wholly satisfactory prototype JASCO, which, like so many military entities of a joint character, had proved to be less than workable when the chips were down.

*** One change proposed in a few quarters however would represent anything but a step forward.  It is the proposal by amphibious unsophisticated that artillery forward observers be once again (as in the pre-1943 days) employed as naval gunfire spotters, and the spotting team of the SFCP therefore eliminated.  While this looks attractive from the swivel chair, it just doesn't work, never did work, and, if adopted, would, in the words of one salty Navy observer, "Set gunfire support back two decades, if not back to Farragut."

By Lt./Col. Robert D. Heinl, Jr., USMC for the Marine Corps Gazette-July 1947